We describe a hedging strategy of CDO tranches based upon dynamic trading of the corresponding credit default swap index. We rely upon a homogeneous Markovian contagion framework, where only single defaults occur. In our framework, a CDO tranche can be perfectly replicated by dynamically trading the credit default swap index and a risk-free asset. Default intensities of the names only depend upon the number of defaults and are calibrated onto an input loss surface. Numerical implementation can be carried out fairly easily thanks to a recombining tree describing the dynamics of the aggregate loss. Both continuous time market and its discrete approximation are complete. The computed credit deltas can be seen as a credit default hedge and may also be used as a benchmark to be compared with the market credit deltas. Though the model is quite simple, it provides some meaningful results which are discussed in detail. We study the robustness of the hedging strategies with respect to recovery rate and examine how input loss distributions drive the credit deltas. Using market inputs, we find that the deltas of the equity tranche are lower than those computed in the standard base correlation framework. This is related to the dynamics of dependence between defaults. We can think of our model as a "sticky implied tree" while the hedge ratios computed by market participants correspond to "sticky strike" deltas, following the terminology of Derman (1999).
Introduction
When dealing with CDO tranches, the market approach to the derivation of credit default swap deltas consists in bumping the credit curves of the names and computing the ratios of changes in present value of the CDO tranches and the hedging credit default swaps. This involves a pricing engine for CDO tranches, usually some mixture of copula and base correlation approaches, leading to some "market deltas". The only rationale of this modus operandi is local hedging with respect to credit spread risks, provided that the trading books are marked-to-market with the same pricing engine. Even when dealing with small changes in credit spreads, there is no guarantee that this would lead to appropriate hedging strategies, especially to cover large spread widenings and possibly defaults. For instance one can think of changes in base correlation correlated with changes in credit spreads. A number of CDO hedging anomalies in the base correlation approach are reported in Morgan and Mortensen (2007) . Moreover, the standard approach is not associated with a replicating theory, thus inducing the possibility of unexplained drifts and time decay effects in the present value of hedged portfolios (see Petrelli et al. (2007) ).
Unfortunately, the trading desks cannot rely on a sound theory to determine replicating prices of CDO tranches. This is partly due to the dimensionality issue, partly to the stacking of credit spread and default risks. Laurent (2006) considers the case of multivariate intensities in a conditionally independent framework and shows that for large portfolios where default risks are well diversified, one can concentrate on the hedging of credit spread risks and control the hedging errors. In this approach, the key assumption is the absence of contagion effects which implies that credit spreads of survival names do not jump at default times, or equivalently that defaults are not informative. Whether one should rely on this assumption is to be considered with caution as discussed in Das et al. (2007) . Anecdotal evidence such as the failures of Delphi, Enron, Parmalat and WorldCom shows mixed results.
In this paper, we take an alternative route, concentrating on default risks, credit spreads and dependence dynamics being driven by the arrival of defaults. We will calculate so-called "credit deltas", that are the present value impacts of some default event on a given CDO tranche, divided by the present value impact of the hedging instrument (here the underlying index) under the same scenario 3 . Contagion models were introduced to the credit field by Davis and Lo (2001) , Jarrow and Yu (2001) and further studied by Yu (2007) . Schönbucher and Schubert (2001) show that copula models exhibit some contagion effects and relate jumps of credit spreads at default times to the partial derivatives of the copula. This is also the framework used by to address the hedging issue. A similar but somehow more tractable approach has been considered by Frey and Backhaus (2007a) , since the latter paper considers some Markovian models of contagion. In a copula model, the contagion effects are computed from the dependence structure of default times, while in contagion models the intensity dynamics are the inputs from which the dependence structure of default times is derived. In both approaches, credit spreads shifts occur only at default times. Thanks to this quite simplistic assumption, and provided that no simultaneous defaults occurs, it can be shown that the CDO market is complete, i.e. CDO tranche cashflows can be fully replicated by dynamically trading individual credit spread swaps or, in some cases, by trading the credit default swap index.
Lately, Frey and Backhaus (2007b) have considered the hedging of CDO tranches in a Markov chain credit risk model allowing for spread and contagion risk. In this framework, when the hedging instruments are credit default swaps with a given maturity, the market is incomplete. In order to derive dynamic hedging strategies, Frey and Backhaus (2007b) use risk minimization techniques. In a multivariate Poisson model, Elouerkhaoui (2006) also addresses the hedging problem thanks to the risk minimization approach. As can be seen from the previous papers, practical implementation can be cumbersome, especially when dealing the hedging ratios at different points in time and different states.
As far as applications are concerned, calibration of the credit dynamics to market inputs is critical. Calibration of Markov chain models similar to ours have recently been considered by a number of authors including van der Voort (2006), Schönbucher (2006) , Arnsdorf and Halperin (2007) , de Koch and Kraft (2007) , Epple et al. (2007) , Lopatin and Misirpashaev (2007) , Herbertsson (2007a Herbertsson ( , 2007b , Cont and Minca (2008) . The aim of the previous papers is to construct arbitrage-free, consistent with some market inputs, Markovian models of aggregate losses, possibly in incomplete markets, without detailing the feasibility and implementation of replication strategies. Regarding the hedging issues, a nice feature of our specification is that the market inputs completely determine the credit dynamics, thanks to the forward Kolmogorov equations. This parallels the approach of Dupire (1994) in the equity derivatives context. Thanks to this feature and the completeness of the market, one can unambiguously derive dynamic hedging strategies of CDO tranches. This can be seen as a benchmark for the study of more sophisticated, model or criteria dependent, hedging strategies.
For the paper to be self-contained, we recall in Section 1 the mathematics behind the perfect replicating strategy. The main tool there is a martingale representation theorem for multivariate point processes. In Section 2, we restrict ourselves to the case of homogeneous portfolios with Markovian intensities which results in a dramatic dimensionality reduction for the (risk-neutral) valuation of CDO tranches and the hedging of such tranches as well. We find out that the aggregate loss is associated with a pure birth process, which is now well documented in the credit literature. In line with several new papers, Section 3 provides some calibration procedures of such contagion models based on the marginal distributions of the number of defaults. Section 4 details the computation of replicating strategies of CDO tranches with respect to the credit default swap index, through a recombining tree on the aggregate loss. We analyze the dependency of the hedging strategy upon the chosen recovery rate. We eventually discuss how hedging strategies are related to dependence assumptions in Gaussian copula and base correlation frameworks.
1 Theoretical framework
Default times
Throughout the paper, we will consider n obligors and a random vector of default times ( ) is the natural filtration associated with the default times.
We denote by 1 , , n τ τ … the ordered default times and assume that no simultaneous defaults can occur, i.e.
1 n τ τ < < … , . P a s − . This assumption is important with respect to the completeness of the market. As shown below, it allows to dynamically hedge basket default swaps and CDOs with n credit default swaps 4 .
We moreover assume that there exist some ( ) 
Market assumptions
For the sake of simplicity, let us assume for a while that instantaneous digital default swaps are traded on the names. An instantaneous digital credit default swap on name i traded at t, provides a payoff equal to ( ) ( )
dN t is the payment on the default leg and ( ) i t dt α is the (short term) premium on the default swap. Note that considering such instantaneous digital default swaps rather than actually traded credit default swaps is not a limitation of our purpose. This can rather be seen as a convenient choice of basis from a theoretical point of view. Of course, we will compute credit deltas with respect to traded credit default swaps in the applications below 5 .
Since we deal with the filtration generated by default times, the credit default swap premiums are deterministic between two default events. Therefore, we restrain ourselves to a market where only default risks occurs and credit spreads themselves are driven by the occurrence of defaults. In our simple setting, there is no specific credit spread risk. This corresponds to the framework of .
For simplicity, we further assume that (continuously compounded) default-free interest rates are constant and equal to r . 4 In the general case where multiple defaults could occur, we have to consider possibly 2 n states, and we would require non standard credit default swaps with default payments conditionally on all sets of multiple defaults to hedge CDO tranches. 5 Note that the instantaneous credit default swaps are not exposed to spread risk but only to default risk.
Hedging and martingale representation theorem
From the absence of arbitrage opportunities, 1 
While the use of the representation theorem guarantees that, in our framework, any basket default swap can be perfectly hedged with respect to default risks, it does not provide a practical way of constructing hedging strategies. As is the case with interest rate or equity derivatives, exhibiting hedging strategies involves some Markovian assumptions (see Subsection 2.3 and Section 4). 6 Let us remark that the assumption of no simultaneous defaults also holds for Q . 7 Let us notice that
Homogeneous Markovian contagion models
. As a consequence, we readily get ( ) 
which is consistent with market practice and regular rebalancing of the replicating portfolio. An investor who wants to be compensated at time t against the price fluctuations of M during a small period dt has to invest t V in the risk-free asset and take positions 1 , , n δ δ … in the n instantaneous digital credit default swaps. Let us recall that there is no initial charge to enter in a credit default swap position.
Intensity specification
In the contagion approach, one starts from a specification of the risk-neutral pre-default intensities 1 Another practical issue is related to name heterogeneity. Modelling all possible interactions amongst names leads to a huge number of contagion parameters and high dimensional problems, thus to numerical issues. For this practical purpose, we will further restrict to models where all the names share the same risk-neutral intensity 10 . This can be viewed as a reasonable assumption for CDO tranches on large indices, although this is obviously an issue with equity tranches for which idiosyncratic risk is an important feature. Since pre-default risk-neutral default intensities, 1 , ,
… are equal, we will further denote these individual pre-default intensities by
For further tractability, we will further rely on a strong name homogeneity assumption, that individual pre-default intensities only depend upon the number of defaults. Let us denote by 11 . This is related to mean-field approaches (see Frey and Backhaus (2007a) 
. Of course, we could think of a non- 8 After default of name i , the intensity is equal to zero: ( ) 0
This Markovian assumption may be questionable, since the contagion effect of a default event may vanish as time goes by. The Hawkes process, that was used in the credit field by Giesecke and Goldberg (2006) , Errais et al. (2007) , provides such an example of a more complex time dependence.
Other specifications with the same aim are discussed in Lopatin and Misirpashaev (2007) . 10 This means that the pre-default intensities have the same functional dependence to the default indicators. 11 Let us remark that on { }
, so that the pre-default intensity of name i , actually only depends on the credit status of the other names. 12 Ding et al. (2006) consider the case where the intensity of the loss process is linear in the number of defaults. Then, the loss distribution is negative binomial.
parametric model. Later on, we provide a calibration procedure of such unconstrained intensities onto market inputs.
For simplicity, we will further assume a constant recovery rate equal to R and a constant exposure among the underlying names. The aggregate fractional loss at time t is given by:
. As a consequence of the no simultaneous defaults assumption, the intensity of ( ) L t or of ( ) N t is simply the sum of the individual default intensities and is itself only a function of the number of defaults process. Let us denote by ( ) , ( ) t N t λ the risk-neutral loss intensity. It is related to the individual pre-default risk-intensities by:
We are thus typically in a bottom-up approach, where one starts with the specification of name intensities and thus derives the dynamics of the aggregate loss.
Risk-neutral pricing
Let us remark that in a Markovian homogeneous contagion model, the process ( ) N t is a Markov chain (under the risk-neutral probability Q ), and more precisely a pure birth process, according to Karlin and Taylor (1975) terminology 13 , since only single defaults can occur 14 . The generator of the chain, ( ) t Λ is quite simple:
Such a simple model of the number of defaults dynamics was considered by Schönbucher (2006) where it is called the "one-step representation of the loss distribution". Our paper can be seen as a bottom-up view of the previous model, where the risk-neutral prices can actually be viewed as replicating prices. As an example of this approach, let us consider the replication price of a European payoff with payment date T , such as a "zero-coupon tranchelet", paying 
We can thus relate the price vector ( , ) V t i to the terminal payoff, using the transition matrix ( , ) Q t T between dates t and T :
The transition matrix solves for the Kolmogorov backward and forward equations ( , ) ( ) ( , )
. In the time homogeneous case, i.e. when the generator is a constant ( ) t Λ = Λ , the transition matrix can be written in exponential form ( )
These ideas have been put in practice by van der Voort (2006) . These papers focus on the pricing of credit derivatives, while our concern here is the feasibility and implementation of replicating strategies.
Computation of credit deltas
We recall that the credit delta with respect to name i is the amount of hedging instruments (the index here, but possibly a i -th credit default swap) that should be bought to be protected against a sudden default of name i . A nice feature of homogeneous contagion models is that the credit deltas are the same for all (the non-defaulted) names, which results in a dramatic dimensionality reduction.
Let us consider a European 16 type payoff and denote its replication price at time t by ( , ) V t i . In order to compute the credit deltas, let us remark that, by Ito's lemma,
t N t dV t N t dt V t N t V t N t dN t t
is associated with the jump in the price process when a default occurs in the credit portfolio, i.e. ( ) 1 dN t = . Thanks to the name homogeneity,
we end up with:
t N t dt V t N t V t N t dN t t N t dt
As a consequence the credit deltas with respect to the individual instantaneous default swaps are equal to:
, t Q H martingale and using Ito-Doeblin's formula, it can be seen that V solves for the backward Kolmogorov equations: 
It can readily be seen that:
I I I I dV t N t r V t N t t N t V t N t dt t N t dV t N t
As a consequence, we can perfectly hedge a European type payoff, say a zero-coupon CDO tranche, using only the index portfolio and the risk-free asset 18 . The hedge ratio, with respect to the index portfolio is actually equal to
previous hedging strategy is feasible provided that
. The usual case corresponds to some positive dependence, thus
The decrease in the index portfolio value is the consequence of a direct default effect (one name defaults) and an indirect effect related to a positive shift in the credit spreads associated with the non-defaulted names.
The idea of building a hedging strategy based on the change in value at default times was introduced in Arvanitis and Laurent (1999) . The rigorous construction of a dynamic hedging strategy in a univariate case can be found in Blanchet-Scalliet and Jeanblanc (2004). Our result can be seen as a natural extension to the multivariate case, provided that we deal with Markovian homogeneous models: we simply need to deal with the number of defaults ( ) N t and the index portfolio Though this is not further needed in the computation of dynamic hedging strategies, we can actually build a bridge between the above Markov chain approach for the aggregate loss and well-known models involving credit migrations (see Appendix A).
Calibration of loss intensities
Another nice feature of the homogeneous Markovian contagion model is that the loss dynamics or equivalently the default intensities can be determined from market inputs such as CDO tranche premiums. Since the risk neutral dynamics are unambiguously derived from 18 As above, in order to ease the exposition, we neglect at this stage actual payoff features such as premium payments, amortization schemes, and so on. This is detailed in Section 4. 19 In the case where
, there are no contagion effects and default dates are independent. We still have
V t N t is linear in the number of surviving names. market inputs, so will be for dynamic hedging strategies of CDO tranches. This greatly facilitates empirical studies, since the replicating figures do not depend upon unobserved and difficult to calibrate parameters.
The construction of the implied Markov chain for the aggregate loss parallels the one made by Dupire (1994) to construct a local volatility model from call option prices. Derman and Kani (1994) , Rubinstein (1994) used similar ideas to build up implied trees. Laurent and Leisen (2000) have shown how an implied Markov chain can be derived from a discrete set of option prices. In these approaches, the calibration of the implied dynamics on market inputs involves forward Kolmogorov equations. For a complete set of CDO tranche premiums or equivalently for a complete set of number of default distributions, Schönbucher (2006) provided the construction of the loss intensities. For the paper to be self-contained, we detail and comment this in the Appendix B. Lopatin and Misirpashaev (2007), Cont and Minca (2008) also detail the similarities between the Dupire's approach and the building of the one step Markov chain of Schönbucher (2006) .
In practical applications, we can only rely on a discrete set of loss distributions corresponding to liquid CDO tranche maturities. In the examples below, we will calibrate the loss intensities given a single calibration date T . For simplicity, we will be given the number of defaults probabilities ( , ), 0,1, , 20 . Now and in the sequel, we assume that the loss intensities are time homogeneous: the intensities do not depend on time but only on the number of realized defaults. We further denote by ( , )
The computation of the loss intensities k λ from the number of defaults probabilities is quite similar to Epple et al. (2007) . For the paper to be self-contained, it is detailed in the Appendix C.
An alternative calibrating approach can be found in Herbertsson (2007a) or in Arnsdorf and Halperin (2007) . In Herbertsson (2007a) , the name intensities
are time homogeneous, piecewise linear in the number of defaults (the node points are given by standard detachment points) and they are fitted to spread quotes by a least square numerical procedure. Arnsdorf and Halperin (2007) propose a piecewise constant parameterization of name intensities (which are referred to as "contagion factors") in time. When intensities are piecewise linear in the number of defaults too, they use a "multi-dimensional solver" to calibrate onto the observed tranche prices 22 . In the same vein, Frey and Backhaus (2007a, 2007b) introduce a parametric form for the function ( , ) t k λ , a variant of the "convex counterparty risk model", and fit the parameters to some tranche spreads. Lopatin and Misirpashaev (2007) express the loss intensity ( , ) t k λ as a polynomial function of an auxiliary variable involving the number of defaults. 20 Clearly, this involves more information that one could directly access through the quotes of liquid CDO tranches, especially with respect to small and large number of defaults. As for the computation of the number of default probabilities from quoted CDO tranche premiums, we refer to Krekel Torresetti et al. (2007) . Practical issues related to the calibration inputs are also discussed in van der Voort (2006). 21 Therefore, the pre-default name intensity is such that ( ) 
Computation of credit deltas through a recombining tree 4.1 Building up a tree
We now address the computation of CDO tranche deltas with respect to the credit default swap index of the same maturity. As for the hedging instrument, the premium is set at the inception of the deal and remains fixed which corresponds to market conventions. We do not take into account roll dates every six months and trade the same index series up to maturity. Switching from one hedging instrument to another could be dealt with very easily in our framework and closer to market practice but we thought that using the same underlying across the tree would simplify the exposition 23 .
The (fractional) loss at time t is given by 
Let us recall that, for a European type payoff the price vector fulfils
where Λ is the generator matrix associated with the number of defaults process. Note that, in the time homogeneous framework discussed in the previous section, the generator matrix does not depend on time.
For practical implementation, we will be given a set of node dates 0 0, , , , Under the previous approximation the number of defaults process can be described through a recombining tree as in van der Voort (2006). One could clearly think of using continuous Markov chain techniques 24 , but the tree implementation is quite intuitive from a financial point of view as it corresponds to the implied binomial tree of Derman and Kani (1994) . Convergence of the discrete time Markov chain to its continuous limit is a rather standard issue and will not be detailed here. 
Let us now deal with a (unitary) premium leg. We denote the regular premium payment dates by 1 Thus, if 1 i t + is a regular premium payment date, the total premium payment is equal to
Let us denote by ( , ) r i k the value at time i t when ( ) i N t k = of the unitary premium leg 26 . If
The CDO tranche premium is equal to (0,0) (0,0)
The value of the CDO tranche (buy protection case) at time i t when ( )
The equity tranche needs to be dealt with slightly differently since its spread is set to 500bp s = . However, the value of the CDO equity tranche is still given by ( , ) ( , ) d i k sr i k − .
As for the credit default swap index, we will denote by ( , ) 
, where R is the recovery rate and n the number of names. According to standard market rules, the premium leg of the credit default swap index needs a slight adaptation since the premium payments are based only upon the number of non-defaulted names and do not take into account recovery rates. As a consequence, the outstanding nominal to be used in the recursion equations providing ( , )
As usual in binomial trees, ( , )
i k δ is the ratio of the difference of the option value (at time 1 i t + ) in the upper state ( 1 k + defaults) and lower state ( k defaults) and the corresponding difference for the underlying asset. In our case, both the CDO tranche and the credit default swap index are "dividend-baring". For instance, when the number of defaults switches from k to 1 k + , the default leg of the CDO tranche is associated with a default payment of ( )
Similarly, given the above discussion, when the number of defaults switches for k to 1 k + , the premium leg of the CDO tranche is associated with an accrued premium payment of 
The credit delta of the CDO tranche at node ( ) , i k with respect to the credit default swap index is thus given by: 27 This is an approximation of the index spread since, according to market rules, the first premium payment is reduced. 28 If
, the premium payment is the same whether the number of defaults is equal to k or 1 k + . So, it does not appear in the computation of the credit delta. 
Let us remark that using the previous credit deltas leads to a perfect replication of a CDO tranche within the tree, which is feasible since the approximating discrete market is complete.
In the next section, we compute CDO tranche credit deltas with respect to credit default swap index in two steps. We first calibrate loss intensities from a one factor Gaussian copula loss distribution. It allows us to examine how the recovery rate assumption and the correlation between defaults impact credit deltas. We then calibrate loss intensities from a loss distribution associated with a market base correlation structure and we compare our "default risk" deltas with some "credit spread" deltas computed on a basis of a bump of credit default swap index spread. We investigate in particular spread deltas computed from the standard market approach and spread deltas recently obtained by Arnsdorf and Halperin (2007) and Eckner (2007).
Model calibrated on a loss distribution associated with a Gaussian copula
In this numerical illustration, the loss intensities k λ are computed from a loss distribution generated from a one factor Gaussian copula. The correlation parameter is equal to 30% ρ = 29 , the credit spreads are all equal to 20 basis points per annum, the recovery rate is such that 40% R = and the maturity is 5 T = years. The number of names is 125 n = . Figure  2 shows the number of defaults distribution. ρ is the correlation between default events in a one factor homogeneous Gaussian copula model where the time t conditional default probability (the probability that a name defaults before t given the latent factor V ) is defined by ( )
, where Φ is the cumulative standard Gaussian density and t p is the time t marginal default probability. In former versions of the paper, ρ was associated with a conditional default probability defined by 31 We checked that various choices of loss intensities for high number of defaults had no effect on the computation of deltas. Let us stress that this applies for the Gaussian copula case since the loss distribution has thin tails. For the market case example, we proceeded differently. Tables 2 and 3 ). As for the equity tranche, it can be seen that the credit deltas are positive and decrease up to zero. This is not surprising given that a buy protection equity tranche involves a short put position over the aggregate loss with a 3% strike. This is associated with positive deltas, negative gammas and thus decreasing deltas. When the number of defaults is above 6, the equity tranche is exhausted and the deltas obviously are equal to zero. At inception, the credit delta of the equity tranche is equal to 54% whilst it is only equal to 25% for the [ ] 3,6% tranche which is deeper out of the money (see Table 3 ). Moreover, the [ ] 3,6% CDO tranche involves a call spread position over the aggregate loss. As a consequence the credit deltas are positive and firstly increase (positive gamma effect) and then decrease (negative gamma) up to zero as soon as the tranche is fully amortized.
Given the recovery rate assumption of 40%, the outstanding nominal of the [ ] 3,6% is equal to 3% for six defaults and to 2.64% for seven defaults. One might thus think that at the sixth default the [ ] 3,6% should behave almost like an equity tranche. However, as can be seen from Table 3 , the credit delta of the equity tranche is much lower: around 1% instead of 50% . This is due to dramatic shifts in credit spreads when moving from the no-defaults to the six defaults state (see Table 1 ). In the latter case, the expected loss on the tranche is much larger, which is consistent with smaller deltas given the call spread payoff.
Sensitivity of hedging strategies to the recovery rate assumption
The previous deltas have been computed under the assumption that the recovery rate was equal to 40% which is a standard but somehow arbitrary assumption. We further investigate the dependence of the dynamic hedging strategy with respect to the choice of recovery rate. For our robustness study to be meaningful, we will modify recovery rates but keep the loss surface (or equivalently the CDO tranche premiums) unchanged. This implies a change in the number of defaults distribution. The procedure is detailed in Appendix D. Table 4 shows the credit deltas at the initial date for various CDO tranches under different recovery assumptions. Fortunately, the recovery rate assumption has a small effect on the computed credit deltas.
Dependence of hedging strategies upon the correlation parameter
Let us recall that the recombining tree is calibrated on a loss distribution over a given time horizon. The shape of the loss distribution depends critically upon the correlation parameter which was set up to now to 30% ρ =
. Decreasing the dependence between default events leads to a thinner right-tail of the loss distribution and smaller contagion effects. We detail here the effects of varying the correlation parameter on the hedging strategies.
For simplicity, we firstly focus the analysis on the equity tranche and shift the correlation parameter from 30% to 10%. It can be seen from Tables 2 and 5 that the credit deltas are much higher in the latter case. After 14 weeks, prior to the first default, the credit delta is equal to 59% for a 30% correlation and to 96% when the correlation parameter is equal to 10%. To further investigate how changes in correlation levels alter credit deltas, we computed the market value of the default leg of the equity tranche at a 14 weeks horizon as a function of the number of defaults under different correlation assumptions (see Figure 4) . The market value of the default leg, on the y -axis, is computed as the sum of expected discounted cash-flows posterior to this 14 weeks horizon date and the accumulated defaults cash-flows paid before 33 . We also plotted the accumulated losses which represent the intrinsic value of the equity tranche default leg. Unsurprisingly, we recognize some typical concave patterns associated with a short put option payoff. As can be seen from Figure 4 , prior to the first default, the value of the default leg of the equity tranche decreases as the correlation parameter increases from 0% to 40%. However, after the first default the ordering of default leg values is reversed. This can be easily understood since larger correlations are associated with larger jumps in credit spreads at 32 Let us remark that credit deltas can be above one in the no default case. This is due to the amortization scheme of the premium leg. We detail in the next section the impact of the premium leg on credit deltas. 33 For simplicity, we neglected the compounding effects over this short period.
default arrivals and thus larger changes in the expected discounted cash-flows associated with the default leg of the equity tranche 34 .
Therefore, varying the correlation parameter is associated with two opposite mechanisms:
-The first one is related to a typical negative vanna effect 35 . Increasing correlation lowers loss "volatility" and leads to smaller expected losses on the equity tranche. In a standard option pricing framework, this should lead to an increase in the credit delta of the short put position on the loss. -This is superseded by the shifts due to contagion effects. Increasing correlation is associated with bigger contagion effects and thus larger jumps in credit spreads at the arrival of defaults. This, in turn leads to a larger jump in the market value of the credit index default swap. Let us recall that the default leg of the equity tranche exhibits a concave payoff and thus a negative gamma. As a consequence the credit delta, i.e. the ratio between the change in value of the option and the change in value of the underlying, decreases.
Taking into account a base correlation structure
Up to now, the probabilities of number of defaults were computed thanks to a Gaussian copula and a single correlation parameter. In this example, we use a steep upward sloping base correlation curve for the iTraxx, typical of June 2007, as an input to derive the distribution of the probabilities of number of defaults (see Table 6 ). The maturity is still equal to 5 years, the recovery rate to 40% and the credit spreads to 20 bps. The default-free rate is now equal to 4%. 3% 6% 9% 12% 22% 18% 28% 36% 42% 58% Table 6 . Base correlations with respect to attachment points.
Rather than spline interpolation of base correlations, we used a parametric model of the 5 year loss distribution to fit the market quotes and compute the probabilities of the number of defaults. This produces arbitrage free and smooth distributions that ease the calculation of the loss intensities 36 . Figure 5 shows the number of defaults distribution. This is rather different from the 30% flat correlation Gaussian copula case both for small and large losses. For instance, the probability of no defaults dropped from 48.7% to 19.5% while the probability of a single default rose from 18.2% to 36.5%. Let us stress that these figures are for illustrative purpose. The market does not provide direct information on first losses and thus the shape of the left tail of the loss distribution is a controversial issue. As for the right-tail, we have 34 Let us remark that the larger the correlation the larger the change in market value of the default leg of the equity tranche at the arrival of the first default. Indeed, in a high correlation framework, this default means relatively higher default likelihood for the surviving names. This is not inconsistent with the previous results showing a decrease in credit deltas when the correlation parameter increases. The credit delta is the ratio of the change in value in the equity tranche and of the change in value in the credit default swap index. For a larger correlation parameter, the change in value in the credit default swap index is also larger due to magnified contagion effects. 35 We recall that in option pricing, the vanna is the sensitivity of the delta to a unit change in volatility. 36 We also computed the number of defaults distribution using entropic calibration. Although we could still compute loss intensities, the pattern with respect to the number of defaults was not monotonic. Depending on market inputs, direct calibration onto CDO tranche quotes can lead to shaky figures. probabilities of large number of defaults are larger, compared with the Gaussian copula case. The probability of the names defaulting altogether is also quite large, corresponding to some kind of Armageddon risk. Once again these figures need to be considered with caution, corresponding to high senior and super-senior tranche premiums and disputable assumptions about the probability of all names defaulting. Figure 6 shows the loss intensities calibrated onto market inputs compared with the loss intensities based on Gaussian copula inputs up to 39 defaults 37 . As can be seen, the loss intensity increases much quicker with the number of defaults as compared with the Gaussian copula approach. The average relative change in the loss intensities is equal to 19% when it is equal to 16% when computed under the Gaussian copula assumption. Unsurprisingly, a steep base correlation curve is associated with fatter upper tails of the loss distribution and magnified contagion effects. 2  4  6  8  10  12  14  16  18  20  22  24  26  28  30  32  34  36  38 Market case Gaussian copula Figure 6 . Loss intensities for the Gaussian copula and market case examples. Number of defaults on the x -axis. Table 7 shows the dynamics of the credit default swap index spreads ( , )
IS s i k along the nodes of the tree. As for tree implementation, the time step is still 1 365 Δ = . Let us remark that up to 12 defaults, loss intensities calibrated from market inputs are on the whole smaller than in the Gaussian copula case. Then, the contagion effect is smaller in the 30% correlation Gaussian copula in low default states and greater for high default states. Unsurprisingly, market quotes lead to smaller index spreads up to 2 defaults at 14 weeks (see Tables 1 and 7 ). This is also coherent with Figure 7 where the conditional expected losses in the two approaches cross each other at the third default. However, as mentioned above, this detailed pattern has to be considered with caution, since it involves the probabilities of 0, 1 and 2 defaults which are not directly observed in the market. After 2 defaults, credit spreads become definitely larger when calibrated from market inputs. Figure 7 . Expected losses on the credit portfolio after 14 weeks over a five year horizon ( y -axis) with respect to the number of defaults ( x -axis) using market and Gaussian copula inputs.
Thanks to Figure 7 we can investigate the credit spread dynamics when using market inputs. We plotted the conditional (with respect to the number of defaults) expected loss ( ) ( ) E L T N t ⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦ for 5 T = years and 14 t = weeks for the previous market inputs and for the 30% flat correlation Gaussian copula case. The conditional expected loss is expressed as a percentage of the nominal of the portfolio 38 . We also plotted the accumulated losses on the portfolio. The expected losses are greater than the accumulated losses due to positive contagion effects. There are some dramatic differences between the Gaussian copula and the market inputs examples. In the Gaussian copula case, the expected loss is almost linear with respect to the number of defaults in a wide range (say up to 15 defaults). The pattern is quite different when using market inputs with huge non linear effects. This shows large contagion effects after a few defaults as can also be seen from Table 7 and Figure 6 . This rather explosive behaviour was also observed by Herbertsson (2007b) , Tables 3 and 4 and by Cont and Minca (2008) , Figures 1 and 3 . In Lopatin and Misirpashaev (2007) , the contagion effects are also magnified when using market data, compared with Gaussian copula inputs. Table 8 shows the dynamic deltas associated with the equity tranche. We notice that the credit deltas drop quite quickly to zero with the occurrence of defaults. This is not surprising given the surge in credit spreads and dependencies after the first default (see Figure 7 ): after only a few defaults the equity tranche is virtually exhausted. 
and: We further examine the credit deltas of the different tranches at inception. These are compared with the deltas as computed by market participants under the previous base correlation structure assumption (see Table 11 ). These market deltas are calculated by bumping the credit curves by 1 basis point and computing the changes in present value of the tranches and of the credit default swap index. Once the credit curves are bumped, the moneyness varies, but the market practice is to keep constant the base correlations when recalculating the CDO tranches. This corresponds to the so-called "sticky strike" rule. The delta is the ratio of the change in present value of the tranche to the change in present value of the credit default swap index divided by the tranche's nominal. For example, a credit delta of an equity tranche previously equal to one would now lead to a figure of 33.33.
[ Table 11 . Market delta spreads and model deltas (a default event) at inception.
First of all we can see that the outlines are roughly the same, which is already noticeable since the two approaches are completely different. Then, we can remark that the model deltas are smaller for the equity tranche as compared with the market deltas, while there are larger for the other tranches.
These discrepancies can be understood from the dynamics of the dependence between defaults embedded in the Markovian contagion model. Figure 8 shows the base correlation curves at a 14 weeks horizon, when the number of defaults is equal to zero, one or two. We can see that the arrival of the first defaults is associated with parallel shifts in the base correlation curves. This increase in dependence counterbalances the increase of credit spreads and expected losses on the equity tranche and lowers the credit delta. The model deltas can be thought of as the "sticky implied tree" model deltas of Derman (1999) . These are suitable in a regime of fear corresponding to systematic credit shifts. The summer 2007 credit crisis provides some evidence that implied correlations tend to increase with credit spreads and thus with expected losses. Figure 9 shows the dynamics of the five year iTraxx credit spread and of the implied correlation of the equity tranche. Over this period the correlation between the two series was equal to 91%. This clearly favours the contagion model and once again suggests a flaw in the "sticky strike" market practice. Table 12 ).
[ The market conditions are slightly different since the computations were done in March 2007, thus the maturity is slightly smaller than five years. The market deltas are quoted deltas provided by major trading firms. We can see that these are quite close to the previous market deltas since the computation methodology involving Gaussian copula and base correlation is quite standard. The models deltas (corresponding to "model B" in Arnsdorf and Halperin (2007) ) have a different meaning from ours: there are related to credit spread deltas rather that then default risk deltas and are not related to a dynamic replicating strategy. However, it is noteworthy that the model deltas in Arnsdorf and Halperin (2007) are quite similar to ours, and thus rather far away from market deltas. Though this is not a formal proof, it appears from Figure 4 , that (systemic) gammas are rather small prior to the first default. If we could view a shock on the credit spreads as a small shock on the expected loss while a default event induces a larger shock (but not so large given the risk diversification at the index level) on the expected loss, the similarity between the different model deltas are not so surprising. As above, model deltas are lower for the equity tranche and larger for the other tranches, when compared with market deltas.
We also compare our model deltas with credit deltas obtained by Eckner (2007) , Table 5 within an affine jump diffusion intensity model where model parameters have been calibrated on CDX NA IG5 quotes of December 2005 (see Table 13 ). In the latter framework, credit deltas are computed from sensitivities of CDO tranche and index prices with respect to a uniform and relative shift of individual intensities. We compute our contagion model deltas from loss intensities calibrated on the same data set. Table 13 . Market deltas, "intensity" model credit deltas in Eckner (2007) and contagion model deltas
Even though the approaches are completely different, once again the outlines are similar. Let us remark that the equity tranche deltas computed by Eckner are higher according to some "sticky delta" rule.
Conclusion
The lack of internally consistent methods to hedge CDO tranches has paved the way to a variety of local hedging approaches that do not guarantee the full replication of tranche payoffs. This may not look as such a practical issue when trade margins are high and holding periods short. However, we think that there might be a growing concern from investment banks about the long term credit risk management of trading books as the market matures.
A homogeneous Markovian contagion model can be implemented as a recombining binomial tree and thus provides a strikingly easy way to compute dynamic replicating strategies of CDO tranches. While such models have recently been considered for the pricing of exotic basket credit derivatives, our main concern here is to provide a rigorous framework to the hedging issue.
We do not aim at providing a definitive answer to the thorny issue of hedging CDO tranches. For this purpose, we would also need to tackle name heterogeneity, possible non Markovian effects in the dynamics of credit spreads, non deterministic intensities between two default dates, the occurrence of multiple defaults, stochastic recovery rates… A fully comprehensive approach to the hedging of CDO tranches is likely to be quite cumbersome both on economic and numerical grounds.
However, from a practical perspective, we think that our approach might be useful to assess the default exposure of CDO tranches by quantifying the credit contagion effects in a reasonable way. We also found some noticeable similarities between credit spread deltas as computed under the standard base correlation methodology and the default risk deltas as computed from our recombining tree. A closer look at the discrepancies between the two approaches suggests some inconsistency in the market approach as far as the dynamics of the correlation is involved. Taking into account such dynamic effects lowers credit deltas of the equity tranche and therefore increases the credit deltas of the senior tranches. From a risk management perspective, understanding how credit deltas are related to base correlation curves requires a coupling of standard vanna analysis and the study of contagion and dynamic dependence effects.
Appendix A: dynamics of defaultable discount bonds and credit spreads
Let us derive the dynamics of a (digital) defaultable discount bond associated with name { } 1, , i n ∈ … and maturity T . The corresponding payoff at time T is equal to 
